United Nations S/2001/240

Security Council

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Letter dated 15 March 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of my letter dated 14 March 2001 addressed to the President of the Security Council requesting him to announce the intention of my Government to pledge a contribution in the amount of US$ 1,083,000 (one million eighty-three thousand United States dollars) to the Trust Fund in Support of the Delimitation and Demarcation of the Ethiopia/Eritrea Border (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter, together with the above-mentioned letter, distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukio **Satoh**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Japan

01-29212 (E) 160301

Annex to the letter dated 15 March 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to you in your capacity as President of the Security Council and with regard to the Council's meeting on 15 March at which it intends to adopt a resolution to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).

Specifically, I would like to refer to Security Council resolution 1177 (1998), paragraph 8, in which a Trust Fund was established for the delimitation and demarcation of the common border between the two countries, and to paragraph 49 of the report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea (S/2001/202), dated 7 March 2001, in which he made an urgent appeal to Member States for contributions to the Fund.

In response to that appeal, I am pleased to inform you that the Government of Japan is now in a position to pledge a contribution in the amount of US$ 1,083,000 (one million eighty-three thousand United States dollars) to the Trust Fund. Preparations for the actual transfer of the contribution are now under way between the United Nations Secretariat and this Mission.

On behalf of my Government, I would like to request that, at the 15 March meeting, you bring to the attention of the members of the Security Council this contribution as a demonstration of Japan's determination to foster the peace process in Ethiopia and Eritrea and to help generate political momentum for the full and prompt implementation of the Peace Agreement.

(*Signed*) Yukio **Satoh**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Japan

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian implications of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the humanitarian implications of sanctions against Afghanistan on a regular basis throughout 2001, including a first report within 90 days of the adoption of the resolution. The present report focuses primarily on the reporting methodology, and an examination of the immediate implications for the humanitarian situation in the first 60 days of the sanctions regime.

2. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan received in December 2000 a report on the humanitarian implications of the sanctions imposed by Security Council resolution 1267 (1999), commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan. That report found that there was a limited but tangible direct impact of sanctions on the humanitarian situation, and also an indirect impact. The present report focuses primarily on issues which are additional to those covered in the December report.

3. The present report finds that the humanitarian situation has not been noticeably and additionally affected by the imposition of the new sanctions imposed under resolution 1333 (2000). The exemption clauses and mechanisms for humanitarian operations appear to be working relatively well. The operating environment of humanitarian agencies, following specific measures taken by the United Nations and the Taliban, has not substantially deteriorated. The report examines in a preliminary manner the causal link of the devaluation of the Afghan currency with the imposition of sanctions. Normally, this would be expected to have a severe humanitarian impact on civilians through increases in the cost of basic imported necessities, but this has not yet been noted. Second, there appear to be some difficulties in ensuring that the maintenance of Ariana Afghan Airlines continues according to necessity, and in maintaining the country's civil aviation infrastructure. The concern expressed by airline officials will be investigated by the United Nations, and technical advice will be sought from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), for future reports.

4. Humanitarian observers have noted that there has been little change in the pattern of conflict in the last few months. Indeed, in some areas, it appears to have increased, as seen in recent outbreaks of fighting in central Afghanistan. Of concern is the impact of the sanctions on the ability of the United Nations to support a peace process, which is necessary to address the severe humanitarian situation in Afghanistan.

5. The Security Council has imposed limited sanctions on the Taliban movement, through its resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). At the same time, the Council has noted the existence of pressing humanitarian needs in Afghanistan and has incorporated comprehensive humanitarian exemption clauses into both sanctions regimes and added to resolution 1333 (2000) a mechanism to review the humanitarian implications of the measures imposed.

01-28923 (E) 210301

6. The measures included in the two sanctions regimes are:

Resolution 1267 (1999)

(a) Aviation restrictions: ban on international flights of aircraft owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban as designated by the sanctions Committee (with exemptions as specified in resolution 1267 (1999));

(b) Financial restrictions: freezing of overseas assets of the Taliban movement and ban on financial transactions with them;

Resolution 1333 (2000)

(c) Additional aviation restrictions: ban on all flights to and from territory of Afghanistan designated by the Committee as being under Taliban control (with exemptions as specified in resolution 1333 (2000));

(d) Additional financial restrictions: the freezing of the assets of Osama bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with him and a ban on making available any funds to such persons;

(e) Diplomatic restrictions: scaling down of Taliban missions and closure of Taliban and Ariana offices abroad;

(f) Travel restrictions: a call to States to restrict the movements of Taliban officials at ministerial and vice-ministerial level;

(g) A ban on the supply of acetic anhydride, the chemical required for the processing of opium to heroin;

(h) Arms embargo: a ban on the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and a ban on the sale or supply of technical advice, assistance or training related to the military activities of the armed personnel under the control of the Taliban.

7. In view of the short period covered in this report, it focuses on the monitoring and reporting methodology, and presents some preliminary findings on the humanitarian impact of the sanctions and on the effectiveness of the exemption mechanisms. More comprehensive reporting and recommendations will be provided in future reports.

II. Procedure and methodology

8. In the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 January 1999 (S/1999/92) the Council proposed, among other things, that the sanctions committees monitor the humanitarian impact of sanctions throughout any sanctions regime.

9. The Security Council, in resolution 1333 (2000), requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, to review the humanitarian implications of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) and to report back to the Council. The reporting will cover the one-year lifespan of the measures imposed by resolution 1333 (2000), starting from 19 January 2001. The present report will be followed by additional reports in June and September, and a final comprehensive report, scheduled for December 2001.

10. The reports will provide the necessary information for the Committee to determine whether there have been any adverse humanitarian consequences arising from the application of the sanctions imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) and investigate the nature and extent of any such impact. Furthermore, the reports will assess the effectiveness of the humanitarian exemption mechanisms and contain recommendations, as necessary, on possible additional mitigation measures to offset adverse humanitarian effects of the sanctions regime.

11. The preparation of these reports will draw heavily upon the capacity and expertise of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan.

Reporting and monitoring methodology

12. Report preparation will be based on a methodology that takes into account previous sanctions assessments in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the availability of data, the time frame of the sanctions regime and the specific measures in resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). The monitoring methodology applies two broad components to the analysis, namely, the profile of vulnerability and the causal analysis.

13. The profile of vulnerability will continue to be developed as a selection of indicators intended to capture the prevailing socio-economic and

humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. The indicators are chosen to measure access to essential goods and services, and the ability of Afghans to deal with further economic and political shocks. Data will be drawn from statistics and surveys conducted by the humanitarian agencies, supplemented where feasible and appropriate by official statistics or data.

14. The causal analysis consists of a series of case studies focusing on specific aspects of the humanitarian situation where there may be a clearly identifiable impact of the sanctions, which may in some cases have been flagged by changes in the vulnerability profile. The case studies are designed to follow the chain of causality, to test whether any deterioration in the humanitarian situation has occurred and whether this is attributable to the sanctions regime or other factors.

III. Vulnerability in Afghanistan

15. The report submitted by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to the sanctions Committee in December 2000 established the vulnerability baseline for sanctions reporting in Afghanistan, as set out below. Subsequent reports will provide information on the movement of these indicators and analyse their causal link, if any, with the sanctions regime. The full text of the original report can be found at www.reliefweb.int

(a) **Health and social indicators**. The health situation in Afghanistan is among the worst in the world, with extremely high levels of mortality and morbidity, the almost complete collapse of government health services, and near total dependence on international aid. Illiteracy is widespread and education is not available at all in many areas, especially to girls.

(b) **Population and displacement**. There are over 2.6 million refugees reported to be living in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, with another 170,000 arriving in Pakistan in recent months. This has been part of a displacement of 500,000 people since August 2000.

(c) **Economy**. The combined effects of drought and conflict have destroyed the Afghan economy. There is a massive food deficit, and the number of vulnerable communities has been sharply rising over the winter.

(d) **Civil society and governance**. Afghanistan now lacks the institutions and mechanisms to protect and promote its people's rights. Public expenditure has virtually ceased for everything except military and religious purposes.

IV. Humanitarian implications of the sanctions regimes against Afghanistan

Previously reported humanitarian impact of sanctions against Afghanistan

16. The report on the impact of sanctions, submitted by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in December 2000 to the sanctions Committee, found that the direct impact of sanctions on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is limited but tangible. The ban on Ariana Afghan Airlines reduced economic activity in some sectors, and limited the possibility of importing medical supplies and humanitarian materials. The curbs on the Afghan banking system acted as a direct disincentive to investment in Afghanistan, and therefore discouraged or inhibited to a limited extent rehabilitation activities.

17. It was also argued in the report that there is an indirect impact of the sanctions on the humanitarian situation. The sense of isolation and the lack of confidence about the future felt by Afghans can be linked circumstantially to the future of the economy, the ability of civil society to influence the Taliban, and the possibility of attracting international funding for rehabilitation activities. The imposition of sanctions was also found to have led to a sharp but temporary devaluation of the Afghani, and a corresponding temporary decrease in the purchasing power of Afghans, especially with respect to food.

18. The points which follow should be seen as adding to those highlighted in the December report, and focus on additional implications for the humanitarian situation related especially to those sanctions included under resolution 1333 (2000).

The humanitarian operating environment

19. In its resolution 1333 (2000) the Security Council recognized the critical humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, the need to maintain humanitarian assistance and the responsibility of the Taliban

authorities to facilitate this assistance. As sanctions were being discussed and implemented, there was substantial concern on the part of humanitarian actors that a negative official or popular reaction to the sanctions could seriously affect the operating environment of humanitarian agencies.

20. In the light of the civil disorder that accompanied the enforcement of sanctions under resolution 1267 (1999), United Nations agencies operating in Afghanistan took precautionary measures at the time of adoption and enforcement of resolution 1333 (2000). The number of United Nations international personnel in the country was reduced by half in the run-up to the adoption of the resolution and all international personnel were temporarily withdrawn as the Security Council met to consider the resolution on 19 December 2000. However, the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, called for the protection of humanitarian personnel and no security incidents attributable to sanctions occurred. Staffing levels were returned to regular levels by the end of January 2001. The security precautions caused some delays in administering the humanitarian activities, and attracted adverse commentary, but there was no major disruption.

21. Overall, the environment within which humanitarian agencies have operated in the wake of resolution 1333 (2000) has not changed substantively. However, it is important to note the inconsistent level of cooperation available from the Taliban authorities. Some restrictions on the movement and operations of humanitarian workers continue to be a problem. The Taliban authorities have stated on numerous occasions that, while they object to sanctions, and consider the political actions of the United Nations to be biased against them, they are prepared to cooperate with the humanitarian wing of the United Nations and other humanitarian bodies.

Civil aviation and transport safety

22. The most direct impact of the sanctions continued to be on Ariana Afghan Airlines. An embargo on all international flights by Ariana Airlines was imposed by resolution 1267 (1999) and this is continued under resolution 1333 (2000). It is supplemented by a ban on all non-humanitarian flights to and from Afghanistan, irrespective of the carrier. For Ariana Airlines this means a suspension of all its international flights, while its domestic flights continue to operate.

23. Humanitarian agency operations have adapted to the sanctions regime under resolution 1267 (1999), and have not used Ariana Airlines for air cargo or passenger services for some time. Indeed, many had ceased use of Ariana prior to the imposition of sanctions. Operations in Afghanistan require an extensive air network, which has now been developed by the humanitarian community.

24. The imposition of the sanctions made it increasingly difficult for Ariana Airlines to carry out essential maintenance. Prior to the Hajj flights, one flight to Jordan for maintenance was authorized for an Ariana Boeing. However, this was delayed by problems in obtaining overflight permission from some neighbouring countries. A request to fly an Antonov to Karachi for maintenance submitted on 13 February 2001 was refused. Instead Ariana technical staff had to overhaul the engine in Afghanistan. Staff at Ariana have complained of problems with the logistics of maintaining the airline in-country. Spare parts are harder to acquire owing to the lack of air freight facilities, the financial restrictions on Taliban institutions, and the objections of the sanctions Committee. Failure to properly maintain aircraft is likely to place Afghan civilians at risk on internal flights. Further clarification may be necessary from the Committee to establish procedures for such work.

25. Also of concern is international civil aviation safety. The Afghan civil aviation authorities are collaborating with IATA and ICAO for the maintenance of navigation systems and facilities for international flights over-flying Afghanistan. After being authorized by the sanctions Committee to access funds held in escrow, the civil aviation authorities were able in January 2001 to inaugurate a new air traffic control system. However, the maintenance and upgrading of civil aviation facilities require that staff of the civil aviation ministry maintain regional and international contacts. These contacts are subject to restrictions under paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution 1333 (2000). Requests for authorization from the Committee to fly to Pakistan for technical meetings were refused in February. Such travel restrictions could compromise cooperation with international bodies responsible for the maintenance of international civil aviation safety and may have an effect on the security of national and international air traffic.

26. Further technical advice on this issue will be sought from IATA and ICAO, and reported to the Security Council in subsequent reports.

Exchange rate instability during the period from December 2000 to February 2001

27. Price and exchange instability had been identified as a potentially indirect impact of the sanctions on the humanitarian situation. The imposition of additional sanctions on the Taliban movement through resolution 1333 (2000) has been accompanied by instability and the rapid depreciation of the Afghan currency. The Afghani lost 18 per cent of its value, relative to the United States dollar from December 2000 to February 2001. The depreciation was double the underlying trend, equivalent to 6 per cent depreciation per month, whereas prior to the imposition of sanctions the average reached a maximum of 3.5 per cent. A link has been observed between the accelerated devaluation and the process of imposing sanctions. Currency traders marked the Afghani down as it became increasingly clear that further sanctions were going to be imposed.[1]

28. Devaluation of a currency can have a serious impact on the humanitarian situation, especially in a country such as Afghanistan, which is currently heavily dependent on imports of basic food and other necessities such as wheat. In 2000, Afghanistan produced an estimated 1,763,000 tons of cereals, which led to a food deficit of 2,104,000 tons, or 54 per cent of the total (compared to an estimated food deficit of 25 per cent in 1999). Fluctuations in the exchange rate can therefore significantly affect the well-being of ordinary citizens in two ways. First, the cost of imported food, upon which most Afghans depend to a greater or lesser extent, will normally rise as a result of currency devaluation. For example, a World Food Programme study in October 2000 showed that 40 per cent of consumption by Kabul households was based on imported food commodities. Second, the increased cost of imported food will drive up demand for locally produced food, already in short supply due to the drought, in markets across Afghanistan. This would normally result in increased prices.

29. However, at the time of writing, the price of basic commodities such as food has not yet risen. The United Nations will continue to monitor this, and provide any update in future reports.

The impact of the armed conflict on the humanitarian situation

30. Conflict is the primary cause of human suffering in Afghanistan, exacerbated substantially by the drought and massive human rights abuses. The intensity of war shows no signs of diminishing, and is at a level at least as intense as that in 2000. Indeed, the fighting in central Afghanistan this winter is unusual, given the difficulties of conducting operations at this time of year. Since the adoption of the sanctions, the parties to the conflict do not appear to have altered their military stance, or their willingness to continue fighting. The only way the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan can be substantially addressed is if the attitude and ability of the parties to the conflict change, and an effective peace process is allowed to proceed.

V. Effectiveness of the humanitarian exemption mechanism

31. Resolution 1333 (2000) provides for the exemption of humanitarian agencies from the measures restricting aviation. Specifically, paragraph 6 provides for non-lethal military equipment "intended solely for humanitarian or protective use". Paragraph 12 provides for exemption from the air embargo for "humanitarian flights operated by, or on behalf of organizations and governmental relief agencies on the list approved by the Committee". Paragraph 14 provides for the exemption of Taliban senior officials of the rank of Deputy Minister or higher, and equivalent dignitaries, from restrictions on their movement when they are travelling for humanitarian purposes. The following actions have been taken with regard to exemptions:

(a) Under paragraph 12 of resolution 1333 (2000), the sanctions Committee on 19 January 2001 approved a provisional list of recognized humanitarian agencies. The list included humanitarian organizations introduced to the Committee by permanent missions, and all agencies operating scheduled flights to Afghanistan. It did not include many of the humanitarian agencies working in the country, particularly Afghan non-governmental organizations.

[1] Other factors affecting the strength of the Afghani were also noted at the time. These included the ban on opium production, the commencement of Hajj flights, the introduction by the United Front of new currency notes, and a scandal in the Da Afghanistan state bank.

(b) On the basis of the provisional list, scheduled humanitarian flights to Afghanistan that are operated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, International Committee of the Red Cross and PACTEC were able to continue without interruption.

(c) The Committee has established a new procedure for updating the list of exempted humanitarian agencies. This involves registration with the Committee and a no-objection procedure through which the Chairman will notify Committee members. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has widely publicized this revised procedure among humanitarian agencies operating in Afghanistan and agencies are in the process of supplying the requested information to the Committee.

(d) In addition to scheduled flights by the regular operators, there were four charter flights for delivery of relief materials during February 2001. These included two flights sponsored by the United States of America and two flights sponsored by Norway and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Major relief items delivered in the additional flights included 44,100 blankets and 934 tents.

(e) On 4 March 2001, the annual flight of sick Afghan children seeking medical assistance in Germany was organized by Peace Village.

(f) The Committee authorized all the non-scheduled humanitarian flights in advance.

32. The annual Hajj pilgrimage started in Saudi Arabia on 4 March 2001. The sanctions Committee approved a programme of Hajj flights to Saudi Arabia, by Ariana Afghan Airlines, to transport up to 15,000 intending Hajjis. As at 26 February, Ariana had transported 12,871 pilgrims on 83 flights. Ultimately, all intending pilgrims who had paid were transported from Afghanistan. Under the auspices of paragraph 14 of the resolution, Mullah Rabbani, the President of the Taliban Council of Ministers, was authorized to fly to Pakistan for continuation of his personal medical treatment. In addition, the Committee authorized one Taliban Minister to travel via Pakistan and all other Taliban Ministers and Deputy Ministers to travel on direct Ariana flights to Saudi Arabia for participation in the annual Hajj pilgrimage. All ministers desiring to do so were able to undertake the Hajj.

33. In conclusion, monitoring to date indicates that humanitarian exemption procedures are operating smoothly and without undue delay. Humanitarian agencies have been able to execute all plans that they have proposed to the sanctions Committee, with minimal disruption or additional administrative burden.

VI. Other observations during the monitoring period

34. Public communications and perceptions of key actors about the nature and impact of sanctions are by themselves likely to shape the impact of the measures concerning the operating environment of humanitarian agencies and the overall humanitarian situation. The Taliban authorities have initiated a sustained campaign against sanctions, employing all State-controlled media. The campaign has involved State-controlled radio and newspapers in Kabul and the provinces, as well as the mosques. This means that a large part of the Afghan population has regularly heard messages condemning the United Nations for the imposition of sanctions and blaming these measures for the deterioration of the humanitarian situation. It should be noted that the United Nations has limited means to sensitize the population to the decisions of the Security Council, and their implications.

35. During the first weeks after the implementation of resolution 1333 (2000) there were some difficulties and confusion in the communications between the sanctions Committee and the Taliban authorities. Improved channels of communication would be useful for the implementation and administration of the provisions of the Security Council resolution.

VII. Conclusion

36. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan remains critical. The vulnerability of the population is compounded by the continuing effects of the drought, the escalating conflict, massive internal displacement, the disruption of the livelihoods of farmers and labourers normally engaged in poppy cultivation, the absence of significant economic recovery, and the lack of a single effective national authority. This acute vulnerability provides the context within which sanctions are being monitored. There is a widespread recognition of the importance of protecting the

international humanitarian assistance programme from any possible adverse effects of the sanctions. Exemption mechanisms to achieve this appear to have functioned smoothly, and humanitarian assistance operations have been able to continue largely unhindered by sanctions.

37. Initial indications from the field suggest that between 19 December 2000 and 18 March 2001 there are no noticeable and additional impacts of the sanctions on the humanitarian situation beyond those reported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in December 2000. Of note has been the devaluation of the Afghan currency, but this has not yet had any impact on the prices of basic commodities. Some concerns have been highlighted about the impact of sanctions on civil aviation. These will be investigated in collaboration with the relevant organizations.

38. Urgent steps should be taken to facilitate procurement of aircraft spare parts, and maintenance flights, for the Ariana fleet. The sanctions Committee may wish to agree a certification process for parts procurement and such flights. It would be possible for IATA to certify requests from the Ariana and civil aviation authorities, using international expertise and technical cooperation already available in the country. Certification that requests were in line with the requirements of meeting internationally recognized safety standards on civilian airliners could speed up Committee decisions on aviation issues and help avert a possible air disaster.

39. Other restrictions on the Taliban, including diplomatic restrictions, the financial measures aimed at Osama bin Laden and his associates and the ban on acetic anhydride do not at this stage have any noticeable humanitarian implications.

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Letter dated 17 March 2001 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instruction of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of the final documents signed at the outcome of the third Meeting on Confidence-building Measures between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, which took place in Yalta on 15 and 16 March 2001, namely, the Yalta Declaration of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides, the Programme of Action on Confidence-building between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides, and the annex to the Programme of Action (see annex to the present letter).

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Valeriy **Kuchinsky**
Ambassador
Acting Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations

01-29395 (E) 190301 190301

Annex to the letter dated 17 March 2001 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Yalta Declaration of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides

15-16 March 2001

The third Meeting on Confidence-building Measures between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides within the framework of the Geneva peace process under the auspices of the United Nations, took place in Yalta on 15 and 16 March 2001, under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Dieter Boden.

During the Meeting, in their desire to ensure favourable conditions for the continuation of the peace process so as to achieve a settlement and prevent a deterioration of the situation in the conflict zone, the Sides reaffirmed their commitments regarding the non-use of force against each other in resolving any disputes, with a view to achieving a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict. They also noted the importance of reaching mutual understanding and accord, and placed special emphasis on their determination to intensify efforts to create the necessary conditions for the voluntary and safe return of refugees to their permanent residences, in the first phase to the Gali district within the old borders.

The Sides noted the failure to prevent the resumption of military activities in May 1998, which appeared to be, inter alia, a consequence of the absence of reliable guarantees for the maintenance of peace. In the course of these events, there had also been a failure to employ in full all the mechanisms for the prevention of hostilities, including the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces and UNOMIG. At the same time, the Sides recognize the stabilizing role of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces and UNOMIG in the conflict zone.

On the basis of the above, striving to secure a durable peace, the Sides requested the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to appeal to the United Nations, the Group of Friends of the United Nations Secretary-General for Georgia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and CIS to become guarantors for the non-resumption of hostilities, the steady and safe return of refugees and displaced persons, in the first phase to the Gali district within the old borders, and to elaborate, with the participation of the Sides, the mechanism to implement these guarantees.

In case of a threat of military clashes or the resumption of military clashes, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces, in accordance with their mandate of 26 May 1995, will undertake immediate measures to disengage military groups of the belligerents, along the disengagement line determined by the Moscow Agreement of 14 May 1994. The Sides reaffirm their commitments regarding the observance of the ceasefire accords. They also reaffirm their obligations to prevent actions which would threaten the life and security of the personnel of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces and UNOMIG, and other international personnel deployed in the conflict zone.

The Sides stressed that confidence-building measures are an important element of the peace process, facilitating progress towards a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. On the basis of the above, the Sides agreed to adopt the Programme of Action on Confidence-building between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides.

The Sides noted that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would inform him about the outcome of this Meeting, and that the Secretary-General would subsequently report thereon to the United Nations Security Council.

The Sides and all the participants in the Meeting expressed their deep gratitude to the Government of Ukraine for the invitation to hold the Meeting in Yalta, for its hospitality and for its active role in creating a constructive atmosphere, which made it possible to achieve important and substantial results.

For the Georgian Side
(Signature)

For the Abkhaz Side
(Signature)

For the United Nations
(Signature)

For the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces
(Signature)

Appendix

Programme of Action on Confidence-building between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides

Yalta, 15 and 16 March 2001

The third Meeting on Confidence-building Measures between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides took place on 15 and 16 March 2001 in Yalta, at the invitation of the Government of Ukraine, under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Georgia, Mr. Dieter Boden, within the framework of the Geneva peace process for the settlement of the conflict under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Georgian Side was represented by a delegation headed by Mr. Giorgi Arsenishvili. The Abkhaz Side was represented by a delegation headed by Mr. Viacheslav Tsugba. Representatives of the Russian Federation as facilitator, representatives of the Group of Friends of the United Nations Secretary-General for Georgia — France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States — representatives of OSCE, the Chief Military Observer of UNOMIG, the Commander of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces and the Executive Secretary of the Georgian-Abkhaz Joint Coordination Commission also participated in the Meeting.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine His Excellency Mr. Anatoli Zlenko, welcomed the participants in the Meeting and delivered an address from His Excellency the President of Ukraine, Mr. Leonid Kuchma. On 14 March 2001, the President of Ukraine met with the heads of the delegations of the two Sides and the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Georgia.

During the Meeting the Sides,

Noting the importance of confidence-building measures for the strengthening of peace and concord and the achievement of reconciliation, and placing special emphasis on their determination to intensify efforts in this field;

Proceeding from the fact that confidence-building measures are by nature an integral part of the Geneva peace process under the auspices of the United Nations, which is facilitating progress towards a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict;

Have agreed on the following:

1. The two Sides recognize the need to improve and reinvigorate efforts in the field of confidence-building measures within the framework of the Geneva peace process. In this connection, they reaffirm their readiness to implement in full the decisions adopted at the Athens and Istanbul Meetings on Confidence-building Measures. Moreover, the Sides declare their intention to implement fully the decisions adopted at the Yalta Meeting on Confidence-building Measures, including those elaborated with the participation of non-governmental organizations.

2. The Sides establish, within the framework of the Coordinating Council, a mechanism for reporting progress made in implementing the agreed confidence-building measures. To this end, the Sides undertake to create and maintain a database containing information on the progress made in implementing the projects.

The database will be accessible via electronic means to all the participants in the peace process. The question of its funding will be discussed further.

3. The Sides designate the representatives who will inform the Coordinating Council at its future meetings of the progress made in implementing the confidence-building measures.

4. In order to ensure the most effective implementation of the confidence-building measures, both Sides undertake to provide, as necessary, the organizational and technical support for such implementation, including the preparation of the necessary travel documents and the provision of venues for meetings, and also undertake to encourage the development of bilateral contacts in general. The Sides commend the work of the Bilateral Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination Commission, reaffirm their readiness to provide it with necessary assistance and, in this connection, request the United Nations to facilitate its work and to provide technical, financial and other support.

5. The Sides approved the Annex containing the list of specific measures on confidence-building measures that are an integral part of the present Programme.

Annex to the Programme of Action on Confidence-building between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides

The present list of specific confidence-building measures has been prepared on the basis of the suggestions put forward during the Yalta Meeting, which took place on 15 and 16 March 2001. This list is not exhaustive, and additional proposals by the Sides will be welcome. The measures proposed constitute recommendations for further action.

The Sides agreed that the modalities for the implementation of these measures would be discussed at the upcoming session of the Coordinating Council. Each Side shall promptly notify the Special Representative in writing of the name of its representative designated in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Programme of Action on Confidence-building between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides.

1. To organize the meeting of the youth representatives of both Sides in Tsinandali.

2. To organize meetings of representatives of different political circles of both Sides.

3. To support the cooperation of organizations of war veterans and invalids of both Sides.

4. To support the continuation of meetings of the Elders of both Sides.

5. To support the conduct of seminars of young scientists of both Sides, within the framework of the projects of the Tbilisi School of Political Research.

6. To organize meetings of students, instructors and lecturers at universities and other higher educational institutions of both Sides, including historians, with a view to restoring scientific ties and the exchange of information and lectures.

7. To support the continuation of contacts between the directors of the Tbilisi and Sukhumi libraries.

8. To organize meetings of the representatives of the Union of Writers of both Sides.

9. To support the initiative to resume "Sukhumpribor" activities, with the participation of the representatives of both Sides.

10. To support the continuation of meetings of aviation representatives of both Sides.

11. To continue close cooperation on the question of moving radioactive wastes currently located at the Sukhumi Physico-technical Institute to a safe storage place.

12. To establish cooperation in wine-making.

13. To promote media coverage of the process of mutual understanding between the Sides within the framework of the implementation of the Programme of Action on Confidence-building, including the activities of the Coordinating Council, its working groups and the Bilateral Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination Commission, as well as the implementation of joint economic, cultural and educational projects, the activities of non-governmental organizations, etc.

14. To broaden the exchange of newspapers between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides by exchanging an equal number of copies of *Sakartvelos Respublica* and *Apsny*, with the financial and material support of the United Nations and OSCE.

15. For faster exchange of information, to provide technical support in setting up direct electronic communications between Apsnypress and Kavkazpress and other media agencies of both Sides, with the assistance of the United Nations.